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Dr. Patrica C. Elliott, CPA 
University of Washington 
Seattle, Washington
The current concern in professional jour­
nals and the multitude of recent cases 
involving auditors’ legal liability to third 
parties would lead one to believe that the 
whole problem is a rather new one. 
However, if one takes a purely historical 
case law approach, one can see a definite 
chronological trend toward increasing lia­
bility since 1919. More surprisingly, the 
legal principles that are followed today 
were formulated in the landmark Ultra­
mares case1 in 1931. Very little (in legal 
terms) has been changed. Only the num­
ber of cases has increased, possibly due to 
increased investor sophistication and/or 
an improved communication system. An 
examination of a few of the older cases 
and their relationship to some current 
cases will demonstrate present applicabil­
ity.
The first case (in the United States) 
involving auditors’ legal liability was de­
cided on the basis of the legal concept of 
privity of contract. This case was the 
Landell case2 in which the auditors were 
not held liable to an investor who relied 
upon the audited statement without the 
knowledge of the auditors. Since the 
investor did not have a contractual rela­
tionship with the auditors, the auditors 
were not held liable for their negligence. 
The court stated that the auditors were 
liable for carelessness or negligence only 
to their client.
The Glanzer case3 widened the appli­
cation of the privity of contract concept. 
Public weighers, rather than auditors, 
were the defendants. Bech was selling 
some beans to Glanzer. Bech asked the 
defendants, the Shepard Brothers, to 
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weigh the beans and to give a copy of 
their certified weight to the buyer 
(Glanzer). The Shepard Brothers did so 
and were paid by the seller (Bech). When 
Glanzer attempted to sell the beans, he 
discovered the weight was incorrect. He 
sued the public weighers (Shepard Broth­
ers) who claimed they were not liable 
because they did not have a contractual 
relationship with Glanzer. Not so, held the 
court. Since the weighers knew the buyer 
would rely upon their certification of 
weight, there existed a relationship so 
close as to approach privity and the 
weighers had assumed a “duty to weigh 
carefully for the benefit of all whose 
conduct was to be governed.”4 Several 
cases were decided later on the closeness 
of the parties rather than on privity of 
contract.
The MacPherson case5 was notable in 
that the court held that the defendant 
was liable to unknown third parties where 
possible injury to “life and limb” was 
present, irrespective of contract. The 
manufacturer of an automobile was 
found guilty and liable when a defective 
wheel collapsed and injured an individual 
who had purchased the automobile from 
a dealer. The implications of this decision 
were analyzed in the landmark Ultra­
mares case where the court refused to 
extend the same liability for negligence to 
“the circulation of a thought or a release 
of the explosive power resident in 
words.” However, fraud does render an 
auditor liable and gross negligence can be 
an inference of fraud. The judge in 
Ultramares examined all aspects of liabil­
ity and established the major legal princi­
ples followed today. These principles 
were a culmination and clarification of 
old principles plus the establishment of 
new ones. Briefly, they are as follows:
1. Privity of contract is not absolutely 
necessary in establishing liability for mere 
negligence. Where the relationship is so 
close as to approach privity, accountants 
are liable to persons who are legally 
“third parties.” Such a relationship exists 
when the auditor has knowledge that a 
third party will rely and/or act upon the 
statements. Such a relationship also exists 
when an accountant audits a company for 
the expressed use by a third party.
2. When mere negligence is present, 
persons having no privity of contract (or 
its equivalent as described in No. 1 above) 
do not have recourse against the auditors. 
However, the auditors are liable to their 
employer (the audited company) for 
mere negligence.
3. Although negligence and fraud are 
not the same, gross negligence can be an 
inference of fraud. A pretense of knowl­
edge where there is no such knowledge is 
fraud. The presence of an “intent to con­
ceal” is also fraud.
4. Where fraud or an inference of 
fraud is present, accountants are liable 
both to persons having privity and to all 
third parties who rely upon their grossly 
negligent (fraudulent) statements.
5. Reliance by third parties is neces­
sary to establish liability, even in cases of 
fraud.
The early cases following Ultramares 
illustrated how workable the distinction 
between mere and gross negligence 
(fraud) was. For example, in the Beard­
sley v. Ernst case,6 the auditors specific­
ally stated in their opinion that they had 
not examined the records of foreign 
constituent companies but had relied 
upon statements certified by a firm of 
chartered accountants. When the foreign 
companies later went defunct, the plain­
tiffs sued on the grounds that the audi­
tors had “pretended knowledge where 
there was no such knowledge.” The court 
held that the auditors were not liable as 
they had clearly disclosed their reliance 
upon information from abroad and there 
was “no pretense of knowledge as to the 
information received which would make 
defendants liable.”
The State Street Trust case7 was 
decided against the auditors under the 
same Ultramares principles. The auditors 
had sent ten copies of a “clean opinion” 
to the client with the knowledge that 
they would be used to obtain credit. 
After a lapse of thirty days, the auditors 
sent the client one copy of the statements 
with additional explanations which indi­
cated that the auditors knew that certain 
reserves were inadequate. The amounts 
involved were material and the court held 
that the auditors were both grossly negli­
gent and had an intent to conceal by not 
disclosing what they knew to the readers 
of the first set of statements.
In more current cases, the same princi­
ples have been applied. Much has been 
written about the Yale Express case8 in 
which the court’s decision against the 
auditors was based on the fact that the 
auditors knew that their statements were 
misleading (as a result of a subsequent 
management study) but failed to disclose 
it to the persons who were relying upon 
the statements. The court held that their 
actions indicated an “intent to conceal” 
and, therefore, fraud.
The Bar Chris case9 involved many 
areas of dispute but the court held that 
there were several material misstatements 
which the auditors either knew or should 
have known. The court held that the 
auditors’ opinion on such misleading 
statements constituted a “pretense of 
knowledge” and “negligence so gross as 
to infer fraud.” Two interesting factors 
were decided in this case: the judge 
attempted to define what constituted 
materiality and the court held that audi­
tors should not be held to a standard 
higher than that of their profession.
In the Continental Vending case10 the 
court held that the auditors should have 
known that the president of the company 
was “looting the company for his own 
private dealings” and that the receivable 
and payable from the president’s affil­
iated company should not have been 
netted. The first holding constituted an 
“intent to conceal” and the latter consti­
tuted “negligence so gross as to infer 
fraud.” The distinguishing factor of this 
case was the imposition of criminal penal­
ties. In other types of cases fraud had 
always resulted in criminal charges, so it 
is not too surprising that such penalties 
were imposed upon auditors.
Two recent cases deserve comment for 
their extension of case law principles. The 
first, the 1136 Tenants’ Corporation case, 
was decided against the accountants al­
though no audit was involved. The ac­
countants had done only the writeup 
work, but the court found that several 
glaring misstatements and omissions 
(missing invoices, irregular entries, etc.) 
constituted negligence so gross as to infer 
fraud. The court held that, since these 
obvious misstatements were not dis­
closed, the accountants were liable even 
though they had not conducted an audit. 
It is possible that this decision will set a 
very unfavorable precedent for future 
cases involving accountants.
The second, the Rhode Island Trust 
case,11 was decided on the Ultramares 
principles even though the auditors had 
issued a disclaimer with their opinion. 
The court held that in spite of their 
disclaimer the auditors had implied in the 
notes to the financial statements that 
certain nonexistent leasehold improve­
ments did exist. This decision points out 
the importance of careful and precise 
wording in audit reports.
It will be interesting to follow the 
trend of auditors’ legal liability in the 
future, but, for the present, it appears 
that Ultramares is still the major prece­
dent and that the principles laid down in 
that case are still the major guidelines in 
auditors’ legal liability.
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CLASSIFIED NEWS
TEACHING AND GRADUATE 
STUDY OPPORTUNITIES
The University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst is seeking several new faculty 
members and graduate students in account­
ing.
Amherst is a delightful New England 
town with a large student population. It 
offers an active and varied cultural life and 
is within easy driving distance of Boston and 
New York City.
Massachusetts offers the usual set of 
degree programs: B.S.B.A, M.S. with con­
centrations in various functional areas, 
M.B.A. and the Ph.D. Research support is 
available through the Center for Business 
and Economic Research. The School also 
coordinates the ABLE program, a federally 
funded consortium of six universities, pro­
viding educational opportunities to minori­
ties at the masters level in business.
Faculty appointments are normally 
made at the Assistant Professor level and 
require a Ph.D. in hand or in progress; CPA 
desirable but not necessary. Appointments 
for visiting and adjunct professors are also 
made.
Salaries and fringe benefits are competi­
tive with similar institutions on the East 
coast.
Graduate students must have a bache­
lor's degree and are admitted to the MBA, 
MS in Accounting or Ph.D. program. Finan­
cial assistance is available for doctoral stu­
dents. Teaching appointments at the in­
structor level for better than average 
compensation can be made.
Interested persons should contact: 
Professor Anthony T. Krzystofik, 
Chairman
Department of Accounting
School of Business Administration 
University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, Mass. 01002
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO
University of Colorado at Colorado 
Springs seeks new assistant professor in 
Managerial Accounting. Requires doctoral 
degree or one year to completion. C.P.A. 
and one to three years business experience 
preferred. Rapidly growing campus in ex­
ceptionally fine community. AACSB- 
accredited college offers BSBA and MBA. 
Send resume to Dr. Robert Knapp, College 
of Business, University of Colorado at 
Colorado Springs, Colorado Springs, 
Colorado 80907. Equal Opportunity 
Employer.
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